Test report DSG-6242 · Rev A · tested November 17, 2026
Supply Chain & PolicyDevice under test
About Half of $2 Billion Disappears in Europe’s Ghost Trade
About half of $2 billion in EU exports to neighboring countries vanished after the 2022 Ukraine invasion, as diverted AI chips, shadow-fleet oil and North Korean routes widened sanctions evasion.
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- Amara Osei
Spec summary
- About half of $2 billion in EU strategic-goods exports vanished in the year after the 2022 Ukraine invasion.
- EU sanctions on Russia began after the 2014 annexation of Crimea and tightened after the 2022 invasion.
- Exports routed through Singapore and Vietnam surged as U.S. tariffs on China rose.
- Alice Huang allegedly brought at least $7.5 billion in U.S.-made AI semiconductors into China.
- Some analysts expect North Korea-China smuggling to surge after the New Yalu River Bridge opened.

By Amara Osei
About half of the $2 billion in strategic goods the European Union exported to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and other neighboring countries in the year after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine disappeared before reaching their stated destinations, the Financial Times reported. Most of the missing volume was presumed to have flowed into Russia.
The European Union first imposed economic sanctions on Moscow after Russia forcibly annexed Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and tightened them after the invasion in 2022. Russia's economy nevertheless did not suffer as heavy a blow as expected, in part because Moscow bypassed the measures through ghost trade.
The shipments covered the first year after the invasion, when the EU had tightened sanctions. Their recorded destinations were neighboring countries, but most of the missing volume was presumed to have flowed into Russia.
What is “ghost trade”?
Ghost trade refers to smuggling aimed at evading export and import controls or international sanctions that target specific countries, institutions or companies. Russia ordered strategic goods from the EU through neighboring countries and then brought them into Russia.
The $2 billion export loss provides the clearest numerical measure of that route. Separately, Russia exports oil to China and India through an unofficial fleet known as the “shadow fleet.” The oil sales extend the same pattern from strategic goods into energy exports.
In plain terms, the declared trade route and the real destination do not always match.
How are semiconductor controls being bypassed?\n
Since the second administration of U.S. President Donald Trump imposed trade sanctions on Beijing, U.S. media outlets have analyzed an increase in roundabout Chinese transactions seeking to escape controls on advanced semiconductor exports. As U.S. tariffs on China soared, tariffs on Singapore and Vietnam remained low, and exports routed through those two Southeast Asian countries surged.
Reuters reported that Alice Huang, suspected of spying for China, allegedly maintained a relationship with Nvidia Chief Executive Jensen Huang and brought at least $7.5 billion worth of U.S.-made artificial-intelligence semiconductors into China.
After U.S. export controls caused Nvidia chip orders bound for China to be halted or delayed, Alice Huang used her relationship with Jensen Huang to secure Nvidia chips and then supplied them to China, according to Reuters. The account links alleged espionage and personal ties to a supply channel carrying at least $7.5 billion in advanced chips.
The tariff divergence changes the route: direct shipments to China face higher tariffs and tighter chip controls, while Singapore and Vietnam provide lower-tariff transit points for exports routed into China.
In plain terms, controls slowed direct sales but did not stop the chips from reaching China.
What could North Korea’s new bridge change?
North Korea also uses ghost trade, smuggling strategic goods through back doors such as China and Russia. Such trade supports the country's continued nuclear and missile development while also serving as an economic prop. The routes keep strategic goods moving to a country subject to United Nations sanctions.
Some analysts expect smuggling between North Korea and China to surge after the recent opening of the New Yalu River Bridge. Their concern is that United Nations sanctions on North Korea will become even more “toothless” if the predicted increase follows the bridge's opening.
Across the three cases, a neighboring jurisdiction stands between the controlled exporter and the prohibited buyer. The declared route and the final market can differ.
The measurable warning is the $2 billion EU loss and the alleged $7.5 billion chip flow; the North Korean increase remains a forecast.
via en.sedaily.com (Source)
More from Amara Osei
Show full bio
Staff writer covering money, funding and market shifts around hardware layer of artificial intelligence at Die Signal.
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